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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Court over appeals from final 
Public Service Commission orders is generally conferred by 
Article VIIIf Section 3 of the Utah Constitution, and sections 
63-46b-16 and 78-2-2(3)(e)(i) of the Utah Code. However, while 
this Court may have general appellate jurisdiction over this 
matter, it lacks subject matter jurisdiction due to the 
Homeowners' failure to comply with the requirements of various 
sections of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether this appeal must be dismissed for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction due to the Homeowners' failure to 
comply with the requirements of sections 54-7-15, 63-46b-12 and 
63-46b-14 of the Utah Code. 
2. Whether this appeal must be dismissed for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction due to the Homeowners' failure to 
comply with the requirements of sections 54-7-13 and 54-7-14 of 
the Utah Code. 
3. Whether this appeal must be dismissed for failure 
to comply with the requirements of section 54-7-9(3) of the Utah 
Code. 
4. Whether the Homeowners' constitutional challenge to 
standby fees under the equal protection clauses of the United 
States Constitution and/or the Utah Constitution must be 
dismissed for failure to overcome the presumption of 
constitutionality. 
5. Whether any remaining issues or arguments must be 
dismissed due to deficiencies in the record and/or the lack of 
specific findings and conclusions in the record regarding standby 
fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
In bringing this appeal, the Homeowners are seeking 
judicial review of the validity and reasonableness of standby 
fees ordered by the Public Service Commission (Commission) for 
Foothills back in 1985. However, for reasons set forth herein, 
the Homeowners' appeal is fatally flawed and must be dismissed. 
Furthermore, the record on appeal is inadequate to allow 
consideration of the merits on appeal. A brief chronological 
review of the factual background will help clarify the relevant 
facts and issues on appeal. 
B. Factual Background. 
Standby fees were first instituted for Foothills in 
Case No. 85-2010-01; by interim order dated September 6, 1985 and 
later by final order dated March 17, 1986. Copies of said orders 
are not contained in the record on appeal and are, therefore, 
attached hereto as Exhibits "A" and "B" respectively and by this 
reference incorporated herein. Although the Homeowners 
participated with counsel in all hearings upon which these orders 
were based, they never objected to, challenged or sought review 
of those orders. 
On July 17, 1987, Foothills filed proposed tariff 
modifications, other than standby fees, with the Commission in 
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Case No. 88-2010-01, however, primarily dealt with 
proposed changes in Foothills' rates and on March 28, 1988, this 
case was stayed pending the outcome of a Third Judicial District 
Court action involving the ownership of the water system. Again, 
since this docket was not included in the record on appeal, a 
copy of the stay order is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and by 
this reference incorporated herein. Therefore, the Commission 
has never issued an order in Case No. 88-2010-01 addressing the 
validity of standby fees. 
On March 29, 1988, the day after the Commission had 
stayed the docket in which the Homeowners had challenged the 
validity of standby fees, the Homeowners filed their Motion for 
Review or Rehearing in Case No. 87-2010-T03, the case which dealt 
with certain tariff modifications other than standby fees. (R. 
at 0098-0100.) However, in addition to these relevant issues on 
review, the Homeowners now attempted to boot-strap their 
challenge on standby fees into their Motion for Rehearing in Case 
No. 87-2010-T03. (R. at 0099, paragraph 3.) Prior to this time, 
the Homeowners had not challenged standby fees in Case No. 87-
2010-T03 and the Commission had never issued any order addressing 
the validity of standby fees on which the Homeowners could seek 
review or rehearing. (R. at 0109.) 
On April 7, 1988, the Commission issued its order on 
rehearing in Case No. 87-2010-T03. (R. at 0101-0103.) In 
addition to addressing the relevant issues on review, the 
Commission's order also summarily dismissed, in one sentence, the 
Homeowners' attempt to boot-strap their challenge to standby fees 
into Case No. 87-2010-T03. (R. at 0102, paragraph 3.) 
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standby fees in question. However, as indicated by the prefatory 
remarks of these orders, the interim order dated September 6, 
1985 was based upon certain proffers of evidence and stipulated 
facts at a hearing held on August 28, 1985. No transcript of 
this hearing and no copies of such proffers and stipulations 
appear in the record. The final order dated March 17, 1986 was 
based upon extensive evidentiary hearings held on January 22, 23, 
24, 27 and 28, 1986. Again, no transcript of these hearings and 
no copies of any written testimony and/or documentary evidence 
presented at these hearings appear in the record on appeal. 
Furthermore, in the final order of March 17, 1986, the 
Commission took administrative notice of, and relied upon as 
additional support, two other dockets in which the Commission had 
imposed standby fees. (Exhibit "B" at page 26, paragraph 22.) 
However, the record on appeal does not contain any of the 
evidence presented or even the resulting orders from these other 
dockets. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Sections 54-7-15, 63-46b-12 and 63-46b-14 of the 
Utah Code require a party to petition the Commission for review 
or rehearing if it is dissatisfied with an order of the 
Commission. As a result of the Homeowners' failure to do this, 
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal. 
Therefore, the Homeowners' appeal must be dismissed. 
2. Inasmuch as the Homeowners actively participated 
with counsel in all hearings upon which Foothills' standby fees 
are based and failed to seek timely review of the Commission's 
final order thereon M.e Homeowners are barred \y section 14 ~ '4 
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Constitution and the Utah Constitution does not overcome the 
presumption of constitutionality set forth in Utah case law. 
Indeed, after including this allegation in their statement of 
issues, the Homeowners never even address this issue in either 
their brief on appeal or their request for agency action. 
Therefore, these issues must be dismissed from this appeal. 
5. Finally, any remaining issues or arguments of the 
Homeowners must be dismissed due to deficiencies in the record on 
appeal. Under any standard of review, this Court is required to 
review the findings, conclusions or determinations of the 
Commission which address the issue on appeal. In the instant 
case, the record contains no such findings, conclusions or 
determinations for this Court to review. Ordinarily this matter 
could be remanded to allow the Commission to correct these 
deficiencies. However, as indicated above, the Homeowners' 
request for agency action is defective and the Commission may not 
entertain such defective requests. Therefore, this appeal should 
be dismissed. In the event the Homeowners wish to continue their 
challenge of standby fees, they may do so by following correct 
procedures which would allow the Commission to address the merits 
of their challenge prior to review by this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION DUE TO THE HOMEOWNERS' FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTIONS 54-7-15, 63-46b-12 AND 63-46b-14 OF 
THE UTAH CODE. 
In bringing this appeal, the Homeowners have failed to 
meet the prerequisites to review by this Court imposed by 
statute. Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15 states, in pertinent part: 
J.^_7_^J.
 R e v ^ e w Q r r e h e a r j_ n g fay c o m mJLS S i0 n 
Application — Procedure — Prerequisite to court 
action 
(1) Before seeking ju^,-^- r^vie . 
commission's action, any party, stoc 
bondholder, or other person pecuniarily mtt * . 
the public utility who is dissatisfied with an orae^ 
the commission shall meet the requirements of this 
section. 
(2) (a) After any order or decisioi i has been made by 
the commission, any party to the action or proceeding, 
or any stockholder or bondholder or other party 
pecuniarily interested in the public utility affected 
may apply for rehearing of any matters determined in 
the action or proceeding . 
(b) No applicant may urge or rely on any ground 
not set forth in the application in an appeal to any 
c o j 1 rt. 
(Emphasi s added.) 
Furthermore, Utal I Code A :iiu iu li J 4tiLj-l/l anil b 4 lib I «J 
of the Admini stxative Procedures Act state, in pertinent part: 
fill" 4fih Il 2 1! gen cy re si i e w Prniwlure 
| 1) If a s ta I:." i be or the agency's rules permit 
parties to ai \y adjudicative proceeding to seek review 
of an order by the agency or a superior agency, the 
aggrieved party may file a written request for review 
within 30 days after the issuance of the order with the 
person or entity designated for that purpose by statute 
or rule. 
63-46b-14. Judicial Review — Exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. 
(1) A par ty aggrieved may obtain j udicial review «of 
final agency action, except in actions where judicid li 
review is expressly prohibited by statute, only after 
exhausting all administrative remedies available .... 
(Empl lasi s added,) 
Therefore, before a pa rty can appeal a Commission order 
C :: mm :i ssiox i: ai :i, original order and ai I :: rder oi i review or 
• dismissal thereof. Failure to meet the jurisdictional 
prerequisites necessary for judicial review by this Court 
requires dismissal of the appeal. 
This Court recently had the opportunity to rule on this 
very issue in the case of Williams v. Public Service Commission 
of Utah, 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988) where the Court stated, in 
pertinent part: 
Prior to deciding the substantive questions presented 
by the parties, this Court must ascertain whether it 
has subject matter jurisdiction over the petitions and 
the appeal before it, * * * The petition to review the 
PSC order dismissing American Paging's application for 
a certificate is governed by section 54-7-15 . . . • 
This Court examined section 54-7-15 and its effects 
upon the Court's jurisdiction in Utah Department of 
Business Regulations v. Public Service Commission, 602 
P.2d 696 (Utah 1979)- There, the petitioner failed to 
follow the process outlined in section 54-7-15 and 
instead filed a petition with this Court. We found 
that section 54-7-15 constitutes a "jurisdictional 
prerequisite" to any judicial review and that "(w)here 
the outlined procedures (in section 54-7-15) have not 
been complied with, this Court is without jurisdiction 
over the subject matter of the dispute." Id. at 699. 
In the instant case, neither American Paging nor any of 
the ^ intervening parties filed an application for 
rehearing with the PSC prior to seeking a writ of 
certiorari. Thus even though they are interested 
parties, their failure to apply for rehearing within 
twenty days of the Commission's issuance of its order 
divests this Court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(1) (1986). Additionally, 
section 54-7-15 states that petitioning parties can 
only bring those grounds before this Court that were 
argued in the application for rehearing, jld. In the 
absence of an application for rehearing, the parties 
are left without anything to appeal. Therefore, this 
Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over the 
petition and will not review the PSC's dismissal of 
American Paging's application for a certificate. 
Id. at 46. (Emphasis added.) 
This Court went on to note that public policy supports 
this conclusion: 
Requiring p a r ti e s t o pgc proceec|ingS to file a petition 
for rehearing prior to seeking judicial review provides 
the PSC an opportunity to correct --
 J: manifest errors 
in its own decisions. The PSC's expertise and 
experience in public utility regulation place it ii 1 the 
best position to review and expeditiously resolve any 
problems with its own decisionsf orders, or rules. 
This process also conserves judicial resources by 
allowing some parties to obtain a resolution of their 
conflicts without involving the expense and t:i me of 
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seeking judicial review by LIIXL CouiL vluiates the provisions ol 
Utah Code Ann. §§54-7-15, 63-46b-12 and 63-46b-14. Therefore, 
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider the 
merits of this appeal and the Homeowners' appeal must be 
dismissed. 
II. THIS APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION DUE TO THE HOMEOWNERS' FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH 
SECTIONS 54-7-13 AND 54-7-14 OF THE UTAH CODE. 
This Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over 
this matter since this appeal, without a prior order of the 
Commission addressing the merits of the Homeowners' challenge, 
amounts to a collateral attack upon the Commission's final order 
of March 17, 1986 establishing standby fees for Foothills. Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-7-14 provides: 
In all collateral actions or proceedings the orders and 
decisions of the commission which have become final 
shall be conclusive. 
The Division recognizes, however, that the Commission 
retains jurisdiction to rescind, alter or amend it previous 
orders pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-13, 
which states, in pertinent part: 
The commission may at any time, upon notice to the 
public utility affected and after opportunity to be 
heard as provided in the case of complaints, rescind, 
alter or amend any order or decision made by it. 
In the case of Bowen Trucking, Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission, 559 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah 1977), this Court considered 
this issue and based its decision, in part, on the following 
language used by the California Supreme Court: 
It is true that the commission's decisions and orders 
ordinarily become final and conclusive if not attacked 
in the manner and within the time provided by law. 
(Citations) This is not to say, however, that such a 
decision is res judicata in the sense in which that 
doctrine is applied in the law courts. """itations) 
The commission has continuing jurisdict; to rescind, 
alter or amend its prior orders at any + • . . 
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III. THIS APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO 
COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SECTION 54-7-9(3) OF THE UTAH 
CODE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-9(3) states, in pertinent part: 
(3) No request for agency action shall be 
entertained by the commission concerning the 
reasonableness of any rates or charges of any gas, 
electrical, water, sewerage, or telephone corporation, 
unless the request is signed by; 
* * * 
(b) by not less than 25 consumers or purchasers, 
or prospective consumers or purchasers, of the gas, 
electricity, water, sewerage, or telephone service. 
(Empha sis added.) 
In the instant case, the request for agency action was 
the Petition for Declaratory Order which was signed only by 
Robert A. Bentley, counsel for the Homeowners Association whose 
president is a standby customer of Foothills. This violation of 
section 54-7-9(3) is particularly relevant in this case because 
Mr. Bentley represents conflicting interests within the 
Homeowners Association. The Homeowners Association is comprised 
not only of standby customers but also connected customers. At 
the time of the Commission's final order in Case No. 85-2010-01, 
there were 63 connected customers and only 54 standby customers. 
The connected customers have already complained about the high 
water rates they have to pay as a result of the Commission's 
orders in Case No. 85-2010-01. The Homeowners even sent a letter 
to Governor Bangerter which, inter alia, stated: "We ended up 
with the highest water rates in the State of Utah...." (R. at 
0003-0006, specifically at 0004.) If standby fees were 
invalidated, as recommended by Mr. Bentley, only the standby 
customers within the association, such as its president, would 
benefit and the connected customers would be forced to pay even 
higher rates for their water. Arguably, section 54-7-9(3) may 
have been enacted to avoid, or at least minimize, this very 
conflict. 
Inasmuch as the Commission is prohibited from 
entertaining requests for agency action which do not comply with 
the foregoing statutory requirements, this Court should not 
judicially review this one. As previously indicated, the 
Commission has never issued an order addressing the merits of the 
Homeowners' challenge to standby fees. From the record it is not 
clear whether this is a result of section 54-7-9(3) or as a 
result of Case No. 88-2010-01 having been stayed. In any event, 
the Commission correctly has never issued an order which 
addresses the merits of the Homeowners' flawed petition. 
Therefore, as a result of the Homeowners' failure to comply with 
the requirements of section 54-7-9(3), as well as the lack of a 
Commission order addressing the merits of the flawed petition, 
this appeal must be dismissed. 
IV. THE HOMEOWNERS' CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO 
STANDBY FEES UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION AND/OR THE UTAH CONSTITUTION MUST BE 
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION OF 
CONSTITUTIONALITY. 
A. Standard of Review. 
In the case of J.J.N.P. Company v. State, Etc., 655 
P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982), this Court considered a constitutional 
challenge based on the equal protection clauses of both the 
United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution and held: 
A presumption of constitutionality is extended to 
statutes not affecting fundamental rights or based on 
suspect classifications and that presumption is 
sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of the 
classification created by a statute unless the 
classification creates an invidious discrimination or 
bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state 
purpose. (Citations omitted.) 
Since the standby fees established by the Commission 
under its authority of sections 54-4-1 and 54-4-4 of the Utah 
Code do not affect fundamental rights and are not based on 
suspect classifications, the foregoing standard of review is 
applicable to the equal protection challenges of the Homeowners. 
B. Analysis. 
The Division is unaware of any case law, and the 
Homeowners have cited to none, which strikes down standby fees on 
constitutional grounds. Indeed, none of the cases cited by the 
Homeowners even address the question of equal protection. The 
only case cited by the Homeowners which even remotely dealt with 
a constitutional question is Augenbaugh v. Board of Supervisors 
of Tuolumne County, 188 Cal.Rptr. 523 (App. 1983) and that case 
1) addressed the question of procedural due process rather than 
equal protection and 2) upheld the validity of standby fees. 
The Homeowners' brief itself never even mentions "equal 
protection" after including it as their first issue on appeal. 
The Homeowners' initial Petition for a Declatory Order likewise 
does not address "equal protection" after including it as an 
issue. Since neither the Homeowners' initial petition nor their 
brief on appeal addresses equal protection beyond their statement 
of issues, they certainly cannot be found to have carried their 
burden in overcoming the presumption of constitutionality as set 
forth in J.J.N.P., supra. This failure to even address this 
issue precludes further analysis and this argument of the 
Homeowners must be dismissed as without merit. 
Furthermore, the Homeowners' initial petition never 
alleged lack of notice or procedural due process violations. The 
Homeowners are barred from now raising this new issue on appeal. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15(2)(b) and Williams, supra. In 
addition, the Homeowners' active participation, with 
representation of counsel, at the hearings which resulted in the 
Commission's interim order of September 6, 1985 and the final 
order of March 17, 1986 imposing standby fees, is sufficient to 
meet the requirements of notice and procedural due process. See 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983). Therefore, this 
argument of the Homeowners must also be dismissed as without 
merit. 
V. ANT REMAINING ISSUES OR ARGUMENTS MUST BE DISMISSED 
DUE TO DEFICIENCIES IN THE RECORD AND/OR THE LACK OF SPECIFIC 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THE RECORD REGARDING STANDBY FEES. 
A. Relevant Statutes. 
The Homeowners' petition alleged that the Commission's 
order imposing standby fees "exceeded the scope of authority 
given to the commission to set reasonable and just utility rates 
as provided in UCA 54-1-2 and/or UCA 54-3-1." However, section 
54-1-2 merely allows the Public Service Commission to succeed to 
the powers and duties previously held by the Public Utilities 
Commission of Utah. Section 54-3-1 governs the duties of public 
utilities rather than the authority of the Commission over public 
utilities. The Homeowners are challenging the authority of the 
Commission to order standby fees rather than claiming that 
Foothills acted independent of Commission orders in charging 
standby fees. Similarly, section 54-3-8 prohibits a public 
utility from charging preferential rates, arguably rates that are 
different than those ordered by the Commission. 
Chapter 4 of Title 54 specifically governs the 
authority of the Commission over public utilities and is so 
entitled. However, prior to their brief on appeal, the 
Homeowners have never even cited to this chapter. In actuality, 
section 54-4-1 sets forth the Commission's general jurisdiction 
over public utilities and section 54-4-4 governs the Commission's 
authority over the classification and fixing of rates. Those 
sections provide, in pertinent part: 
54-4-1. General jurisdiction. 
The commission is hereby vested with power and 
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every public 
utility in this state, and to supervise all of the 
business of every such public utility in this state, 
and to do all things, whether herein specifically 
designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary 
or convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction . . . . 
54-4-4. Classification and fixing of rates after 
hearing. 
(1) Whenever the commission shall find after a 
hearing that the rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges 
or classifications, or any of them demanded, observed, 
charged or collected by any public utility for any 
service or product or commodity, or in connection 
therewith, including the rates or fares for excursion 
or commutation tickets, or that the rules, regulations, 
practices or contracts, or any of them, affecting such 
rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or 
classifications, or any of them, are unjust, 
unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential, or in 
anywise in violation of any provisions of law, or that 
such rates, fares, tolls, rentals, charges or 
classifications are insufficient, the commission shall 
determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates, 
fares, tolls, rentals, charges, classifications, rules, 
regulations, practices or contracts to be thereafter 
observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order 
as hereinafter provided. 
(Empha sis added.) 
This is exactly what the Commission did in establishing 
standby fees for Foothills back in 1985 and any request for 
agency action by the Homeowners challenging the reasonableness of 
such rates must comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. §§ 
54-7-9(3) and 54-7-13 before it can be considered. 
B. Standard of Review. 
This Court stated in Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company v. Public Service Commission, 535 P.2d 1143, 
1147 (Utah 1975) that the Commission's "proceedings and findings 
are presumed to be correct unless they are capricious or 
arbitrary or are not supported by the evidence." Therefore, the 
Homeowners have the burden of establishing that the Commission's 
order on review is incorrect. If the Homeowners are unable to 
meet this burden, then their appeal must be dismissed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) of the Administrative 
Procedures Act states, in pertinent part: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, 
on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that 
a person seeking judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on 
which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional 
on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or 
applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful 
procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to 
follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were 
illegally constituted as a decision-making body or were 
subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a 
determination of fact, made or implied by the agency, 
that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to 
the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior 
practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that 
demonstrate a fair and rational basis for the 
inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Although this Court has frequently addressed its scope 
of review of Commission orders, it apparently has not had the 
opportunity to do so under the foregoing statute. Prior 
decisions of this Court have been based upon section 54-7-16 
which, with the enactment of the Administrative Procedures Act, 
has since been repealed. Nevertheless, this Court's statements 
concerning its scope of review of Commission orders are still 
relevant and should be considered. 
The Homeowners' brief in this area is grossly 
deficient. Although their brief is careful to point out 
statements by this Court that the Commission has "no inherent 
regulatory power (sic) other than those expressly granted or 
clearly implied by statute," their brief ignores additional 
statements by this Court which elaborate thereon and which 
specifically address this Court's scope of review. 
For example, the Homeowners cited the case of Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Public Service 
on 
Commission, 754 P.2d 928 (Utah 1988) but did not acknowledge that 
this Court also stated: 
Utah Code Ann- § 54-4-4 (1986) gives the 
Commission broad discretion in establishing rates for 
public utilities. See Kearns-Tribune Corp. v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 682 P.2d 859, 860. Any activities that 
are related to rate making are therefore subject to the 
Commission's powers in this area. 
Id. at 931-932. 
In Kearns-Tribune, supra, this Court also stated: 
The lack of explicit statutory authority to "regulate 
advertising," however, is not dispositive of the 
question before us because the PSC certainly has 
considerable latitude in performing its rate-regulation 
function. Any activities of a utility that actually 
affect its rate structure would necessarily be subject 
to some degree to the PSC's broad supervisory powers in 
relation to rates. The question, then, is whether the 
activity the Commission is attempting to regulate is 
closely connected to its supervision of the utility's 
rates and whether the manner of the regulation is 
reasonably related to the legitimate legislative 
purpose of rate control for the protection of the 
consumer. 
Id. at 860. 
Regarding the different types of review that are 
possible when reviewing Commission orders, this Court recently 
stated in Williams, supra: 
When reviewing the PSC's interpretation of general 
questions of law, this Court applies a correction-of-
error standard, granting no deference to PSC decisions. 
Utah Dep't of Admin. Serv. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 
P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983). This Court will afford 
great deference to PSC findings on matters of basic 
fact, upholding those findings based on any evidence of 
substance. Id. at 608-09. For matters of ultimate 
fact, mixed findings of fact and law, and the PSC's 
interpretation of the operative provisions of the 
statutory law it is empowered to administer, PSC 
findings must be rationally based and are set aside 
only if they are imposed arbitrarily or capriciously or 
are beyond the tolerable limits of reason. Id. at 609-
12. The statutes governing the jurisdiction of the PSC 
fall within this third, intermediate category. Thus, 
we will grant deference to the PSC's determination of 
its own jurisdiction if that determination is within 
the tolerable limits of reason. 
Id. at 50. 
C. Analysis. 
From the foregoing discussion of this Court's scope of 
review it should be readily apparent that regardless of the type 
of review which might be involved, each requires as a basis for 
review some finding, conclusion or determination in the record 
upon which the Commission order was based. In the instant case, 
the record contains no such findings, conclusions or 
determinations upon which this Court might review the validity or 
reasonableness of standby fees. The record on appeal is 
hopelessly deficient in this regard. 
It is entirely possible that during the rate case 
portion of Case No. 85-2010-01 (or in Case Nos. 83-076-01 and 85-
570-01 cited therein as additional support) that the Commission 
imposed standby fees for reasons similar to those stated by the 
Virginia State Corporation Commission in In Re Lake Monticello 
Service Company, 57 PUR 4th 155, 166 (1983): 
However, I believe there are compelling reasons for 
recommending the adoption of an availability fee, as 
proposed by the company, in this case. First and 
foremost, absentee landowners do have a real interest 
in seeing the system maintained and kept ready for 
their use in the future. An adequate water and sewer 
system is a benefit to them personally, and also 
increases the value of their property. Secondly, as 
the protestant has pointed out, a significant, though 
perhaps unquantifiable portion of the operation and 
maintenance expense incurred by the company is expended 
on a system which is too large, in some respects, for 
the current customer level. It is unfair to call upon 
current usage customers to bear all of such expenses. 
In addition, the Commission could have considered the 
added fire protection benefits afforded to all property owners 
within the Foothills certificated area. However, the record on 
appeal does not contain any findings, conclusions or 
determinations to show what the Commission considered when it 
established standby fees for Foothills back in 1985. From the 
record, it is also unknown exactly what position the Homeowners 
took when they participated in the hearings which led to those 
rates, other than the fact that they did not challenge the 
standby fee at that time. It is very likely that the Homeowners, 
at that time, supported the concept of standby fees. After all, 
including standby fees in Foothills' rate structure directly 
benefited connected customers within the Homeowners Association 
(whose numbers exceeded the number of standby customers.) Again, 
however, the record on appeal is not sufficiently complete to 
make such a determination. 
The Homeowners do concede in their brief, however, 
that: 
a utility should be compensated for the unused capacity 
it must maintain in order to meet the service 
requirements of new customers . . . . 
As their alternative to standby fees, the Homeowners suggest 
increasing connection charges — a suggestion which certainly was 
not part of their initial petition and one which may or may not 
have already been considered by the Commission in the rate case 
portion of 85-2010-01. In any event, this suggestion is barred 
by section 54-7-15(2)(b) from now being raised in this appeal and 
only serves to illustrate the need to consider Foothills' entire 
rate structure when evaluating standby fees. The Homeowners have 
acknowledged that the elimination or reduction of the standby fee 
must necessarily be accompanied by an increase in Foothills' 
other rates. Therefore, judicial review of the validity and/or 
reasonableness of standby fees is not presently possible due to 
the substantial deficiencies in the record on appeal. 
Ordinarily, this Court could remand this case for the 
Commission to correct the deficiencies. However, as indicated 
above, the Homeowners' initial petition did not meet the 
threshold requirements of section 54-7-9(3). Therefore, on 
remand, the Commission is still prohibited from entertaining the 
Homeowners' flawed request for agency action. As a result, if 
the Homeowners wish to continue their challenge of standby fees, 
they must file a new and proper request for agency action with 
the Commission and follow correct procedures which would allow 
the Commission to address the merits of their challenge prior to 
judicial review by this Court. Therefore, the Homeowners' appeal 
should be dismissed rather than remanded. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Division respectfully 
requests this Court to dismiss this appeal. 
Dated this 7*W^day of April, 1989, 
CLL i 
DALE T. COULAM 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for the Division 
130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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EXHIBIT A 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Applica-
tion Of FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, 
INC. for a Certificate of Con-
venience and Necessity to 
Operate as a Public Utility. 
CASE NO. 85-2010 -01 
SECOND INTERIM REPORT 
AND ORDER 
Certificate No. 2151 
Appearances: 
Ralph J. Marsh 
Steven R. Randle 
Lee Kapalowski, and 
Dean H. Becker 
Brian W. Burnettf 
Assistant Attorney 
General 
ISSUED: September 6, 1985 
For Foothills Water Company, 
Inc., Applicant 
* Hi-Country Estates Home 
Owners1 Association, 
Protestant 
" Division of Public 
Utilities, Department of 
Business Regulation, 
State of Utah, Intervenor 
By the Commission: 
Pursuant to notice duly served, a Prehearing Conference 
in the above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing on 
August 28, 1985 before Kent Walgren, Administrative Law Judge for 
the Utah Public Service Commission at the Commission Offices at 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. At the Prehearing 
Conference certain proffers were made and facts stipulated to and 
the Administrative Law Judge took official notice of Exhibit 3 of 
Applicants original Application and Administrative Law Judge, 
having been advised in the premises, now makes and enters the 
following recommended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Interim Report and Order, 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1« For purposes of establishing interim rates, we find 
that Foothills Water Company, Inc. ("Foothills" or "Applicant") 
pumped a total of 37,000,000 gallons of water in 1984. Of that 
amount, 16,000,000 gallons were used by the residents of Hi-
Country Estates, 16,000,000 gallons were used by Jesse H. Dansie 
("Dansie") under a Well Lease dated April 7, 1977 (Exhibit 4), 
and the remaining 5,000,000 we attribute to (Exhibit 4), and the 
remaining 5,000,000 we attribute to leakage. During 1984 the 
average resident of Hi-Country Estates used approximately 20,000 
gallons of water per month. 
2. Foothills has sixty-four (64) water hook-ups and 
fifty-nine (59) standbys. Foothills can reasonably expect to 
collect about 65 percent of its standby fees. 
3. Applicant needs to be able to cover the following 
monthly expenses in order to continue operating on an interim 
basis: 
(a) Insurance $131.92 
(b) Well Lease Payment $600.00 
(c) Power $1600.00 
(d) Property Taxes $266.67 
(e) Maintenance and Operation $1774.60 
Total Monthly Costs $4373.19 
Pursuant to paragraph E.5. of its Well Lease with Dansie, Appli-
cant is entitled to collect the power costs of pumping water 
supplied to Dansie. We attribute half of the leakage to Dansie 
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and find that the customers should be responsible for one-half, 
or $800.00, of the $1600.00 monthly cost of power. Thus, interim 
rates which generate $3573.19 in monthly income are needed. The 
figures for insurance, well lease, power and property taxes were 
obtained from Applicant's Amended Application Schedule "A"; the 
figure for monthly maintenance and operating costs was obtained 
by dividing Applicant's 1984 yearly maintenance and operating 
costs by twelve (see original application, Exhibit 3) . These 
figures are reasonable for purposes of establishing interim 
rates. Since Applicant's ratebase is disputed, no depreciation 
expenses or return on equity can be granted at this time. 
4. The following interim rates are reasonable and 
should generate sufficient income to allow the Applicant to cover 
the expenses allowed in paragraph 3: 
(a) $27.50 minimum per month per hook-up for the first 
5000 gallon block of water. Revenue produced: $1760.00. 
(b) SI.50 per 1000 gallons over 5000. Revenue 
produced: $1440.00. 
(c) Monthly standby fee: $10.00. Revenue produced: 
$383.50. 
Total Monthly Revenue: $3583.35 
5. For some years prior to 1985, Foothills charged its 
customers a yearly fee of $400.00 for the first 325,000 gallons 
and $1.25 per 1000 gallons thereafter. In the Stipulation 
between the parties (Exhibit 1, as amended on the record), 
Foothills reduced its claim by 25%—from $400.00 to $300.00 per 
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year. Paragraph 10 of the Stipulation states: "...any dis-
agreements concerning the interpretation or application of the 
terms of this Stipulation shall be resolved by the Public Service 
Commission...w Paragraph 7 of the Stipulation is silent and 
therefore ambiguous as to the amounts Applicant is entitled to 
collect for water in excess of 325,000 gallons. We find that 
93.75 cents per 1000 gallons ($1.25 reduced by 25 percent) is 
reasonable. Foothills has disconnected five homeowners apparent-
ly for failing to pay for water in excess of 325,000 gallons. 
Since the Stipulation was ambiguous in this regard, it is not 
unreasonable to require Foothills to reconnect the disconnected 
users (without charging any disconnect or reconnect fees) upon 
payment of the amounts due for excess water. Applicant also 
raised questions about the rates to be charged prior to February 
1982. We find no ambiguity in the Stipulation as to those 
amounts. 
6. Representatives of the Homeowners1 Association read 
the meters on July 28, 1985 and the rates set forth in the 
Stipulation should be applicable to that date. The parties 
stipulated that effective July 28, 1985, the interim rates 
established in paragraph 4, supra, should take effect. Any 
homeowner who has paid $100.00 into the escrow account described 
in Paragraph 2 of the Stipulation should receive a credit against 
any amounts owing. 
7. The Homeowners' Association filed a Petition to 
Amend certain Findings of Fact in the Interim Report and Order 
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issued August 8, 1985. Any ruling on that Petition is deferred 
to the general rate hearing at which time the parties may present 
evidence bearing on the ownership of the water system. 
8. We find that there is just cause for believing 
Dansie is a indispensable party to this proceeding and that an 
Order to Show Cause should issue ordering him to appear before 
this Commission on Monday
 f the 16th day of September y 1985, at 
10:00 a.m., and show cause why he should not be made a party to 
this proceeding. 
9. We find that the Applicant has not yet established 
an account with Utah Power and Light Company in the name of 
Foothills Water Company, Inc. and that it is reasonable to expect 
it to do on or before Tuesday, September 3, 1985. 
10. Applicant has not filed with the Commission a legal 
description of its service area. It is reasonable to expect 
Applicant to file the legal description on or before September 6, 
1985. 
11. The parties agreed that a copy of the executed 
Stipulation could be filed hereafter and entered into evidence as 
Exhibit 8 and it is so received. 
12. We find that it would be in the public interest for 
the Applicant to approach the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy 
District about the possibility of its making available (for a 
fee) an employee to manage and operate the Foothills system until 
such time as the system may be acquired by the District. It is 
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reasonable for the Applicant to make such inquiry on or before 
September 13, 1985. 
13. The Homeowners' Association has not tendered to 
Foothills all of the funds collected pursuant to the Stipulation 
and it is reasonable to expect those funds to be tendered on or 
before August 29, 1985 together, with an up-to-date accounting 
therefor. 
14. It is reasonable for Foothills to provide the 
Division and Homeowners1 Association with a monthly accounting of 
Applicant's disbursements during the interim period. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Applicant should be allowed to file interim rates, 
charges and regulations. The rates and charges should be $27.50 
per month for the first 500.0 gallons and $1.50 per 1000 gallons 
thereafter with a standby fee of $10.00 per month for those lot 
owners not presently connected. All amounts collected by Appli-
cant during the interim period are subject to refund after 
permanent rates are established. 
2. Paragraph 7 of the Stipulation is ambiguous as to 
the cost for water used in excess of 325,000 gallons. A fee of 
93.75 cents per 1000 gallons in excess of 325,000 gallons is 
reasonable. Inasmuch as the Stipulation was ambiguous in this 
regard, it is reasonable to require Foothills to reconnect any 
users without charging any disconnect or reconnect fees upon 
receipt of payments for the excess water. The Stipulation is not 
ambiguous as to amounts due prior to February, 1982. 
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3. The rates set forth in the Stipulation should be 
effective until July 28, 1985. Although the Commission does not 
ordinarily make rates retroactively, since the Parties so stip-
ulated, we conclude that the interim rates should become effec-
tive July 28, 1985, Homeowners who have paid $100.00 into the 
escrow account described in paragraph 2 of the Stipulation should 
receive a credit against any amounts owing. 
4. The issues of rate base, depreciation, return on 
equity and ownership of the system are in dispute and should be 
reserved for the final hearing. 
5. Section 54-2-1 (35) (c) , Utah Code Ann. (1953), as 
amended, states: 
(c) If any person or corporation performs 
any service for or delivers any commodity to 
any public utility as defined in this sec-
tion, that person or corporation is con-
sidered to be a public utility and is subject 
to the jurisdiction and regulation of the 
commission and to this title... 
Jesse H. Dansie appears to be a necessary party to this proceed-
ing and he should be ordered to appear before this Commission and 
show cause why he should not be made a party. 
6. Applicant should be required to establish an 
account with Utah Power and Light on or before September 3, 1985 
and to file with the Commission a legal description of its 
service area on or before September 6, 1985. During the interim 
period, Applicant should be required to provide the Division and 
Homeowners1 Association with a monthly statement of disburse-
ments. On or before August 29, 1985, the Homeowners' Association 
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should be required to tender to the Applicant any amounts col-
lected pursuant to the Stipulation, together with an up-to-date 
accounting therefor, 
7. Applicant should be required to approach the Salt 
Lake County Water Conservancy District prior to September 13, 
1985 about the possibility of its making an employee available to 
manage and operate Foothills' system. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That Applicant be 
permitted to file on an interim basis rates, charges, and regu-
lations for service. The rates and charges during the interim 
period, which shall be effective retroactively to July 28, 1985, 
are a minimum service rate of $27.50 per month for the first 5000 
gallons and $1.50 per 1000 gallons thereafter with a standby fee 
of $10.00 per month for those lot owners not presently connected. 
All amounts collected by Applicant during the interim period are 
subject to refund at the time permanent rates are established. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That for the period February, 
1982 through July 28, 1985, water in excess of 325,000 gallons 
per year be billed and paid for at the rate of 93.75 cents per 
1000 gallons. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That Jesse H. Dansie appear 
before this Commission on Monday, the 16th day of September, 
1985, at 10:00 a.m. , and show cause why he should not be made a 
party to this proceeding. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the issues of rate base, 
depreciation, return on equity and ownership of the water system 
be reserved for final hearing. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That Applicant: establish an 
account with Utah Power and Light on or before September 3, 1985; 
file with the Commission a legal description of its service area 
on or before September 6, 1985? approach the Salt Lake County 
Water Conservancy District prior to September 13, 1985 about the 
possibility of its making an employee available to manage and 
operate Foothills1 system; and provide the Division and Homeown-
ers' Association with a monthly statement of disbursements during 
the interim period. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the Homeowners' Association 
tender to Foothills, on or before August 19, 1985, any amounts 
collected pursuant to the Stipulation together with an up-to-date 
accounting therefor. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That this matter be continued to 
October 7, 8 and 9, 1985 (the parties should also reserve October 
10) at which time evidence shall be offered and received en 
permanent rates. All requests by any party for documents or 
information shall be made on or before September 6, 1985 and 
responded to no later than September 20, 1985. The parties shall 
exchange witness lists no later than September 27, 1985. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That this Order shall be effec-
tive August 28, 1985. 
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 6th day of Septem-
ber, 1985. 
/s/ Kent Walgren 
Administrative Law Judge 
Approved and confirmed this 6th day of September, 19 85, 
as the Report and Order of the Commission. 
I si Brent H. Cameron, Chairman 
(SEAL) I si James M. Byrne, Commissioner 
I si Brian T, Stewart, Commissioner 
Attest: 
I si Georgia B. Peterson, Secretary 
EXHIBIT B 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter o£ the Application) 
Of FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, INC.) CASE NO, 35-2010-01 
for a Certificate ox Convenience) 
and Necessity to Operate as a ) REPORT AND ORDER 
Public Utilitv. ) 
ISSUED; March l*7, 19 3 6 
Appearances: 
Brian W. Burnett For division of Public Utilities 
Assistant Attorney General Department of Business 
Regulation, State cr Utah, 
Intervenor 
Val R. Antczak w Foothills Water Company, 
Inc. , 
Applicant 
Stephen R. Randle " Hi-Country Estates Home 
Owners1 Association, 
Protestant 
By the Commission: 
Pursuant to notice duly served, this matter came on for 
general rate hearing on January 2?, ?3, ~IA, ln and 29, 19S5, 
before Kent Walgren, Administrative Law Judge for the Utah Public 
Service Commission. Applicant, Foothills Water Company, Inc. 
("Foothills") filed its original Application on June 1, 1995. 
Hearings were held on July 3f 19S5 and July 23, 1985, at which 
time some evidence was offered and received. On August 8, 19 85 
the Commission entered its Order granting Applicant a Certificate 
of Convenience and Necessity and sanctioning interim rates in 
accordance with a stipulation between the Applicant and the 
homeowners of Hi-Country Estates. On August 15, 1985. Applicant 
filed its Amended Application, praying that the Commission 
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approve a basic water rate of $152.00 per month per customer, 
plus an additional amount for usage over 2"?,0CC gallons per 
month. On August 28, 1985 additional evidence was offered and 
received, on the basis of which the Commission (see Second 
Interim Report and Order issued September 6, 1985) set interim 
rates (subject to refund) of $27.50 per month for the first 5,000 
gallons and $1.50 per 1,000 gallons over 5,000 and a standby fee 
of $10.00 per month for lot owners unconnected to the water 
system. 
In its September 6, 1985 Report and Order the Commis-
sion, having concluded that it may not be able to set just and 
reasonable rates without asserting jurisdiction over Jesse 
Dansie, the supplier (pursuant to a lease) of the water to 
Hi-Country Estates, ordered Mr. Dansie to appear on September 16, 
1985 and £how cause why he should not be made a party to this 
proceeding. On account of ever mounting legal fees and represen-
tations by counsel that negotiations for the sale of the water 
company were underway that might remove the Commission's juris-
diction, a final ruling on that issue was deferred. Although a 
sale of Foothills1 shares to Rod Dansie, son o* Jesse Dansie, was 
consummated, Commission Jurisdiction was rot affected. On 
January ?1, 1986, 'just prior to the general rate hearing, the 
parties, having apparently concluded that the Commission could 
set just and reasonable rates without asserting personal juris-
diction over Jesse Dansie, moved that the show cause be quashed 
which motion the Administrative Law Judge took under advisement. 
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The Administrative Law Judge, having been fully advised 
in the premises, now makes and enters the following recommended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Report and Order based 
thereon: 
FINDINGS OF FACm 
1. Applicant is a corporation organized and existing 
under the laws of the state of Utah; Applicant was incorporated 
in June, 1985. On August 8, 1985 Applicant was granted Certifi-
cate of Convenience and Necessity No. 2151 and interim rates were 
set by this Commission. The interim rates were modified by the 
Commission's Second Interim Report and Order issued September 6, 
1985. 
2. Protestant, Hi-Country Estates Home Owners' Asso-
ciation ("Homeowners") is a Utah non-profit corporation consist-
ing of the homeowners of Hi-Country Estates subdivision, Phase I, 
located a few miles southwest of Herriman, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
3. Applicant is a water corporation, proposing to 
provide culinary water to a residential area in the southwest 
corner of Salt Lake County. Applicant's proposed service area 
(see Exhibit 16) includes all of the Hi-Country Estates subdivi-
sion, Phase I, plus three areas (approximately one-sixteenth 
section each) along the western border of the platted subdivision 
and referred to as the "Tank 2 area", the "South Oquirrh area" 
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and the "Beagley area" (see Exhibit 17) . The proposed service 
area differs slightly from that approved by the Commission when 
Applicant was granted its certificate. 
4. Applicant's service area consists of 63 active 
customers and 54 standby customers. In addition, the well and 
facilities which supply water to Applicant also supply water to 
thirteen (13) hook-ups outside the service area to the southeast, 
referred to hereafter as the "Dansie hook-ups11 or "Dansie prop-
erties." 
5. Applicant's ownership of water company assets is 
contested by the Homeowners and is the subject of a lawsuit 
currently pending in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County (Civil No. C85-6748) . 
6. Hi-Country Estates subdivision, Phase I ("Subdivi-
sion") , was initially developed in about 1970 by a limited 
partnership consisting of general partners Gerald H. Bagley 
("Bagley"), Charles Lewton ("Lewton") and Harold Glazier 
/"Glazier") and a few additional limited partners. Subdivision 
Public Report #3?5, issued by the Real Estate Division of the 
Utah Department of Business Regulation on June S, 1970 (Exhibit 
69), states that as of that date the plat had not been recorded. 
The Public Report, which was to be delivered to prospective lot 
purchasers, also states: 
WAT^R: Water will be supplied by the Salt 
Lake County Water Conservancy District... 
Costs of installation to be borne by subdi-
vides 
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The Report further notes tha*-. the Salt Lake County Water Conser-
vancy District ("Conservancy District") has not yet annexed the 
property and that before it does certain facilities will have to 
be constructed. 
"7. On August 16
 f 1970, a limited partnership consist-
ing of Bagley, Lewton and Glazier, entered into an agreement 
(Exhibit 42) with -Jesse Dansie and his wife, Ruth, pursuant to 
which the Dansies leased to the partnership a well and wa^er 
rights (evidenced by Certificate ^821°, application *26451 ^  to 
1.19 cfs (cubic feet per second* . The water was to be used by 
the partnership to supply water to its "subdivision(s) developed 
and being developed in the area..." The term of the lease was 
five (5) years, during which time the partnership was to pay the 
Dansies $300 per month, or a total of 218,000. In addition, the 
partnership was to maintain the well, provide the Dansies one (1* 
connection at actual cost and the Dansies were to be allowed to 
use the water at any time it was not being used by the develop-
ers, for which the Dansies were to pay the costs of pumping. The 
partnership also had an option to extend the lease an additional 
five (5) years for $600 per month. The well referred to in this 
lease can produce approximately 480 gallons per minute and is 
located a few hundred feet north of the subdivision boundary on 
property owned by Jesse Dansie. It is referred to hereafter as 
"Well No. 1". 
8. In March, 1971, Bush & Gudgell, registered profes-
sional engineers, prepared specifications for the construction of 
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the following month the Conservancy District was formally peti-
tioned (but apparently never acted affirmatively) to annex the 
Subdivision. In or about 1972, the Subdivision plat was approved 
and recorded and construction began on seme homes. 
9. On April 1, 1974 (the photocopy of Exhibit 50 
appears to read 1971, but the last page of Exhibit "A" of Exhibit 
51 gives the date April 1, 1974) a renewable five-year lease was 
executed between Hi-Ccuntry Estates (a corporation and a general 
partner of the developer partnership) and Roy Glazier, the owner 
of Let 51, for the lease of an existing deep well (hereafter 
"Glazier Well11) which would provide water for the Subdivision. 
The terms were $300 per month ror the first five years and $400 
per month for the next five years. In addition, Glazier would be 
permitted to withdraw seven (7) gallons per minute from April 1 
to October 1 at no cost, the lessee being required to pay the 
pumping costs and maintenance. A letter from the Utah State 
Department of Health to Hi-Country Estates, dated June 3, 19"4, 
approves the Glazier Well for 72 residential connections, "based 
on a supply of 80 gallons per minute... as certified b" Call 
Engineering, Inc." 
10. Although Bagley was involved in the initial devel-
opment of the Subdivision, sometime about 1972 he withdrev; from 
the limited partnership. Then, in May of 19^4 he personally 
repurchased the development from the developer partnership. The 
Agreement (Exhibit 51) memorializes the sale o* sixteen (16) 
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unsold lots, the rights in the Glazier Well lease, the obliga-
tions under the Dansie well Agreement and "All rrght, title and 
interest in and to the water system and equipment serving Hi-
Country Estates." 
11. On April 7, 1977, Jesse Dansie, as lessor, and 
Bagleyf as lessee entered into a "Well Lease and Water Line 
Extension Agreement" (hereafter "Well Lease Agreement") for Well 
No. 1, the same well upon which the 1970 lease had been executed 
(see paragraph 7, supra). Under this ten-year lease fwhich 
expires in April, 1987), in return for the use of the well and 
water therefrom, Bagley agreed to the following: 
a. To pay $5,100 plus $300 per month for the first 
five years and $600 per month for the next five years. 
b. To provide Jesse Dansie with five free residen-
tial hook-ups to members of his immediate family, including 
reasonable amounts of culinary and irrigation water, presumably 
at no cost. These hook-ups were for Jesse Dansiefs children who 
were building or planning to build homes just east of the Subdi-
vision. 
c. To provide Jesse Dansie with fifty (50) free 
residential hook-ups. These would be charged water fees by 
Bagley, who would pay 50 percent of any amounts collected to 
Jesse Dansie. 
d. That Jesse Dansie be allowed to use any excess 
water not being used by Bagley for only the costs of pumping. 
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e. To indemnify and pay Dansiers court costs and 
attorney's fees "of any nature whatever" which arise out of the 
Well Lease Agreement. No comparable provision was made for 
Bagley's indemnification or the recovery of his legal fees should 
he prevail. 
f. That Jesse Dansie be provided water on these 
same terms for as long as the Subdivision water system is in 
existence (even after the expiration or termination of the 
agreement). 
In addition, the Well Lease Agreement provided for the 
construction of three water line extensions, all to be completed 
within one year: 
Extension No. 1: From Well No. 1 to the lines of the 
existing Hi-Country Water Company system (along the north 
Subdivision boundary). Jesse Dansie was to dig the trench and 
Pagley was to provide pipes and all other materials and ease-
ments. Extension Mo. 1 was to be maintained by Pagley and owned 
by Jessee Dansie. Dansie would also have the right to take water 
from any part of the extension to serve his own property. 
Extension No. 2: From the most easterly point or the 
Subdivision to the Dansie water line at approximately "200 T-est 
and 13300 South (all outside of the Subdivision). Dansie was to 
pay for, maintain and own this extension, but Pagley was to be 
permitted to run water from the Subdivision system through this 
line, to property he owned approximated three '3) miles east of 
the Subdivision, which he hoped to develop to be known as "The 
Foothills." 
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Extension No. 3^  Dansie was to install, pay for and own 
an extension from his own water system at 6800 West and 13000 
South extending along 6800 West to 13400 South. This extension 
would terminate at the northwest corner of Section ? (T4Sf R1>D , 
in which Bagley owned the property just referred to. Bagley was 
to maintain this extension during the term of the Agreement. 
Subsequently, on July 3, 1935, the 'fell Lease Agreement 
was amended to define the "reasonable" amount of water to be 
provided at no cost to the five (5) Dansie immediate family 
hook-ups as 12,000,000 gallons per year, to provide in addition 
free water to Lot 51 of the Subdivision, apparently now owned by 
one of the Dansies, and to specify that the pumping fees for any 
excess water used by the Dansies be restricted to incremental 
pumping power costs, rather than shared power costs for pumping. 
12. In 1980, the Subdivision water company was trans-
ferred from Bagley to another limited partnership, Jordan Acres 
("Jordan Acres"), of which Bagley was a general partner. On June 
lf 1985, the day the initial Application was filed with this 
Commission, the water company assets were transferred from Jordan 
Acres to Foothills, in return for all of Foothills1 outstanding 
shares. On October 31, 1985 all of the stock and assets of 
Foothills were transferred from Bagley to Rod Dansie. Dansie, 
who had been watermaster of the Subdivision water system for a 
number of years, took control of Foothills in partial satisfac-
tion of $80,447.43 he claimed from Bagley for unpaid bills for 
labor and materials furnished to the water svstem. 
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13. Between 1970 and 1981, the residents of the Subdi-
vision were charged $100 per year for water. In February, 1981, 
Bagley summarily raised the yearly water rate to $400. The 
residents balked, tempers flared, and in 1985 Bagley was finally 
forced to seek Commission sanction of rates. 
14. From about 1972 until August 3, 1985, when Appli-
cant was granted its Certificate of Convenience and Necessity, it 
acted illegally as an uncertificated public utility. The record 
is clear that Bagley and his partners knew from the beginning 
that unless they were annexed by the Conservancy District they 
would be subject to Commission jurisdiction. In a letter, dated 
May 27, 1970 (Exhibit 68), rrom Lewtcn to the Conservancy 
District, T.ewton notes that "we do not intend to become a water 
utility company..." In the April 7, 1977 Well Lease Agreement 
between Bagley and Jesse Dansie, paragraph F.3. states: 
3. Dansie further agrees that Bagley 
may apply to the Utah Public Service Commis-
sion for such permits or approvals as may be 
required and Dansie shall cooperate fully in 
all respects as may be required to obtain 
such permits or approvals as may be required 
by the Public Service Commission. Bagley 
agrees to pay all costs incurred in obtaining 
such approval, including, but not limited to, 
legal and engineering fees. 
Despite Bagleyfs awareness that he was subject to Commission 
jurisdiction, the records of the Commission show no contact by 
him orior to June of 1985. 
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WELL LEASE AGREEMENT 
15. Of the various problems involved in setting the 
just and reasonable rates mandated by U.C.A. Section 54-3-1, the 
Well Lease Agreement described in paragraph 11 above is the most 
troublesome. The Commission finds that it is unreasonable to 
expect Foothills to support the entire burden of the Well Lease 
Agreement. This Agreement, insofar as it relates strictly to 
benefits received by Foothills (without taking into account the 
benefits Bagley may have perceived in view of his future develop-
ment plans) is grossly unreasonable, requiring not only substan-
tial monthly payments, but also showering virtually limitless 
benefits on Jesse Dansie and the members of his immediate family. 
There is some evidence on the record to indicate that both Bagley 
and Jesse Dansie had future development plans in mind (perhaps 
even in'some form of partnership) and that the Well Lease Agree-
ment was entered into on both sides primarily with that in mind 
and only secondarily to provide water to the residents of the 
Subdivision. We find that the Division's estimate of the actual 
value of the Well Lease of $368 per month or $4,416 per year 
(Exhibit 58), is reasonably accurate. 
Yet the benefits which Jesse Dansie stands to receive, 
in addition to the $600 monthly lease payments, are substantial: 
a. 50 free hook-ups. Value: $37,500 ($750 x 50). 
b. Five free residential hook-ups. Value: $3,750 
($750 x 5). 
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c. 12,000,000 gallons of free water per year. (We 
note that this is nearly as much as the entire projected yearly 
consumption by the 63 active customers of the Subdivision.) 
Using Applicant's figures for annual power costs to Foothills 
customers for the main pump only ($11,497.84 (see Exhibit 53), 
plus incremental pumping costs for the additional 12,000,000 
gallons (S2,540.95 see Exhibit 85, p. 3), the total cost of power 
is $14,03S."79* per year, of which 44 percent (see Exhibit 62 — 
Allocation Factor Based on Usage), or S6 ,lnn .0*7, is attributable 
to the Dansies. When the chemical costs attributable to the 
Dansies of %lnS are added (see Exhibit 85, p. 3), the total 
estimated value o* the free water is 56,353.06 per year. 
Since the Well Tiease Agreement purports to require 
Bagley to provide water on these same terms "for such time beyond 
the expiration or termination of this Agreement as water is 
supplied to any of the Hi-Country properties or that the lines 
and water system referred to in this Agreement are in exis-
tence...ff, if one assumes, for example, that the system installed 
in 1972 has a 40-year useful life (see Exhibit 24) and that the 
costs of power and chemicals remain the same, the potential value 
of the 1^,000,000 gallons of free water alone from 19nn, the year 
* The July 3, 19S* Amendment to the Well Lease Agreement (Exhibit 
10) which defines the "reasonable" free wa^er for the Dansies as 
1?,000,000 gallons and specifies that the power costs for excess 
water shall be figured incrementally rather than proportionately 
lacks meaningful consideration and is, to the extent relevant to 
our inquiry, 4 nvalid.. 
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the lease was executed, to the year 2012, is $222,357.36. While 
no one can blame Mr, Dansie for desiring to provide free water to 
his children in virtual perpetuity, this Commission would be 
abrogating its statutory duty were it to impose such a burden en 
Foothills1 present and future customers. 
d. Although it is difficult to arrive at precise 
dollar values for the rights to the excess water and for the 
indemnification rights and rights to legal fees, it is undeniable 
that these have some value. 
Thus, the total potential liability under the Well 
Lease Agreement is in excess of $263,607. We find that it would 
be unjust and unreasonable to expect Foothills' 63 active cus-
tomers to support the entire burden of the Well Lease Agreement. 
We further find that payment of the $600 monthly Lease payment by 
Foothills will adequately cover the value of the benefit Foot-
hills is receiving under the Lease and that the remaining burdens 
of the Lease should be Bagley's personal obligation. Paragraph 
F.2. of the Well Lease Agreement makes Bagley personally respon-
sible to fulfill the terms and conditions of the Lease, whether 
or not a water company is created to which Bagley conveys or 
assigns the Well Lease Agreement. Under paragraph F.3. of the 
Lease, Jesse Dansie agrees that Bagley may apply to the Public 
Service Commission for a certificate and Dansie agrees to "coop-
erate fully in all respects as may be required to obtain such 
permits or approvals as may be required by the Public Service 
Commission." As part of Mr. Dansie's cooperation with the 
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Commission, it is reasonable to expect him to look to Foothills 
for the $600 monthly lease payment and to Bagley personally for 
any remaining obligations under the Well Lease Agreement. 
At the hearing, Rod Dansie offered some testimony as to 
his father's intentions with respect to the Well Lease Agreement 
in the event the Commission were to require the Dansies to pay 
for the water obtained from Well No. 1. He indicated that the 
Dansies own numerous other v/ells and water rights in the area and 
that they would likely disconnect themselves from the Foothills 
system and obtain their water elsewhere. 
It is, of course, up to Jesse Dansie where he procures 
his water. The Commission has no objection to the Dansies 
continuing to obtain their water from Well >?o. 1, provided the 
actual pro-rata (not incremental) costs ror power, chlorination 
and water testing involved in delivering that water are paid for 
by someone other than the customers in Applicant's service area. 
We find that it is reasonable ror Foothills to bill "''esse Dansie 
for the actual cost of any water provided to hin, his family or 
his other connections, and ^or Mr. Dan?>ie to seek reimbursement 
for s=me from Bagley. 
RATE BASE 
16. The amount of rate base to be allowed the Applicant 
is contested. Applicant (P.ev. Exhibit 23) claims a rate base o^ 
$14?,200.56, the capital expenses for improvements acquired since 
19 75 that remain used and useful. The Division recommends 
f"1,05°. ^ 3, the cost of the six-inch meter installed in December, 
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1985 to measure the amount of water being consumed by the Dansies. 
The Division claims that since there is a dispute as to the 
ownership of Foothills assets, no additional rate base should be 
allowed {see Exhibits 12, 40 and f>n) . The Homeowners, claiming 
ownership of all assets of the water system, argue that Appli-
cant's rate base should be zero. 
17. We find that all improvements to Foothills prior to 
1981 are not includeable in rate base because: 
a. Bagley was selling lots at a profit until 19"6 
(see Exhibit 25^ . 
b. The improvements made between 1977 and 1930 
were to have been provided by Bagley as part of the original 
system. For improvements made from 1981-1985, we find as 
follows: 
1981: The pressure valve by lot #16 and the new air 
and vacuum valve and check valve on booster station are allowable 
in rate base (see Rev. Exhibit 23). Total allowed: $2,611.93. 
1982: The new controls for tank #2 and new relay en 
booster station are allowable in rate base (see Rev. Exhibit 23). 
Total allowed: $1,116.47. 
1983: No costs allowable for rate base. The 75 H.P. 
motor becomes Jesse Dansie's property by the terms of the Well 
Lease Agreement. Insofar as the replacement of the 600-foot 
section of main is concerned, we find that Applicant failed tc 
demonstrate that the costs involved in making that repair were 
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just and reasonable and that there is a valid dispute as to the 
ownership of the main. In addition, Bagley would have been 
responsible to assure that the main was in good condition before 
the system would have been accepted by the Conservancy District. 
d. 19 84: No improvements. 
e. 1985: The replacement of booster pump, starter 
control panel, new tank overflow control valves, six-inch meter-
ing station and li-inch metering station are allowable in rate 
base. The check valve for the deep well is not allowable because 
it becomes Jesse Dansie's property by the terms of the Well ^ease 
Agreement. Total allowed: $13,606.59. 
Thus, Applicant's total allowable rate base is 
$16,334.99. 
RATE OF RETURN 
13. The parties stipulated, and the Commission finds, 
that 12 percent is a reasonable rate of return. 
EXPENSES 
19. The Commission notes that Bagley's management of 
Foothills and its predecessors has been less than commendable and 
finds there is cause for concluding the utility will be more 
competently managed in the future. Given the expected improve-
ments, and ambiguities in the costs of providing service in the 
past, the Division's projected test year ending December 31, 1036 
seems reasonable. U.C.A. Section 54-4-4(3^, however, limits 
future test periods to 12 months from the date of filing (amended 
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filing date: August 16, 1985); we will thus have to adopt a test 
year ending December 31, 1985 (see Rev. Exhibit 20) and make 
attritional adjustments to reflect future conditions. The 
Homeowners generally supported the Division's recommendations in 
this area. 
a. Accounting and Administrative: Applicant is 
requesting 510,200; the Division and Homeowners recommend $3,006. 
Applicant intends to hire an accountant at ?18.00 per hour; the 
Division contends that a computer accounting service is adequate. 
Applicant's figure includes the cost of office rental and S1~0-
$200 per month for a secretary. The Division's witness testified 
that Rod Dansie should run the water company out of his home at 
no charge to the users. We find that the Division's and Appli-
cant's figure of $3,000 is reasonable, with the following adjust-
ments: 
(i) Applicant is entitled to be reimbursed for 
the reasonable costs of office space (either in Rod Dansie?s home 
or elsewhere) sufficient to hold a desk, file cabinet and tele-
phone. We find that $50 per month ($600 per year) is reasonable. 
(ii) The Division assumed that the time re-
quired to read meters would be two hours per month; Rod Dansie 
testified it takes four—five hours. We find that four hours per 
month for meter reading is reasonable and that $17.20 per hour 
(the hourly wage paid to Conservancy District employees) is more 
reasonable than the $20 per hour proposed by Applicant. We thus 
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adjust the Division's recommended figure upward $34.40 per month 
or $412.80 per year. Total allowed: $4,012.80. 
b. Insurance: The parties agreed, and we find, 
that $2,500 per year is reasonable. 
c. Water lease payment: $7,200 (see paragraph 15, 
supra). 
d. Utilities: 
Main Pump. Our allowed expenses in this category are based 
upon the following assumptions: 
(i) The Dansies will obtain their water 
elsewhere (if they elect to receive it from Well -1, since the 
water company will collect their pro rata pumping costs, the 
power costs for the utility will be slightly reduced, . gi-ren 
UP&Vs rate structure). 
(ii) The customers will use a total of 
13,000,000 gallons during 1986, of which five percent will be 
lost to leakage or theft. 
fiii) The main pump delivers 260 gallons per 
minute. 
(iv) The kilowatt demand o^ the pump is 6^kW 
(see Exhibit 21) . 
(v) For every gallon of water used in the 
low-use months (January-May, October-December) 4.54 gallons o* 
water are used during the high-use months (June-September) (see 
Exhibit 53) . 
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(vi> For two of the high use months, because of 
breaks or fires, the main pump will operate on Schedule 6, rather 
than Schedule 3. 
(vii) Electric Service Schedule 35, the Monthly 
Energy Charge Adjustment which is incorporated into both Sched-
ules 3 and 6 (of which we take official notice and which will 
result in a relatively small adjustment upward) imposes an 
additional charge of $.00406 per kWh. 
Thus, an average of 4R9,458 galleys per month will be 
pumped during the lew-use months and 2,?71,0R4 gallons per mrnth 
during the high-use months, requiring the pump to operate 21.4 
hours during the low-use months and 145.6 hours during the 
high-use months. 
Under UP&Lfs Schedule No. 3, we calculate the monthly 
bills as follows: 
(i) Low-Use Months: Customer Service Charge 
($55.39), plus Demand Charge (66 JcW x S3.^5 per kT 7^ = $:4",.50)# 
plus Energv Charge (2072 kWh x $.0408"7 = $?4.68) plus Energy 
Charge Adjustment (2072 kWh x $.00406 = $8.41). Total monthly 
charge: $395.98. 
(ii) High-Use Months: 
(a) Schedule 3: Customer Service Charge 
($55.39), plus Demand Charge (66 kW x $3.75 per kW = $?4"7.50), 
plus Energy Charge (9610 kWh x $.04087 = $392.76) plus Energy 
Charge Adjustment (9610 kWh x $.00406 * $39.02). Total monthly 
charge: $734.67. 
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(b) Schedule 6: Customer Service Charge 
($28.66), plus Demand Charge ([66 kW minus 5 kW] x $9.18 per kW = 
$559.98), plus Energv Charge ([500 kWh x .131755 = $65.38] plus 
[9110 kWh x .058169 = $529.92] = $595.80), plus Energy Charge 
Adjustment (9610 kWh x $.00406 = $39.02). Total monthly charge: 
$1,223.46. 
Total for eight low-use months: 8 months x $395.93 = 
$3,167.84; total for two high-use months on Schedule 3: 2 x 
$734.67 = $1,469.34; total for two high-use months on Schedule 6: 
2 x $1,223.46 = $2,446.92. 
Total allowed for main pump: $7,084.10. 
Booster Pump: Our allowed expenses in this category are 
based upon the following assumptions: 
(i) Kilowatt demand of the booster pump is 
23 kW (see Exhibit 41) . 
(ii) Homeowner demand will drop from 17,000,000 
gallons in 1985 to 13,000,000 gallons in 19?6 (76.5 percent of 
1935). 
(iii> Since the booster pump consumed 33,038 kr«\h 
in 1985, it will consume approximately 29,126 kWh in 19 86. 
(iv) For e^ery gallon of water used in the 
low-use months, 4.64 gallons of water are used during the high-
use months; thus, the booster pump will use 1097 kWh per month in 
low-use months and 5088 kWh per month in high-use months. 
(v) For two of the four high-use months, 
because of fires or other emergencies, two booster pumps will be 
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required, resulting in a change from small customer to large 
customer status. 
Using UP&L's Schedule No. 6, we calculate the monthly 
bills as follows: 
(i) Low-Use Months? Customer Service Charge 
(54.05) , plus Demand Charge (18 kW x 26.45 per kw = $116.10), 
plus Energy Charge ([500 kWh x $. 092602 = $46. 301 plus [59"> kT*h x 
$.040887 = $24.41] = $70.71), plus Energy Charge Adjustment (1C9~ 
kwh x S.00406 = $4.45). Total monthly charge: S195.31. 
(ii) High-Use Months: 
(a) Small customers: Customer Service 
Charge (S4.05), plus Demand Charge (116.10), plus Energy Charge 
([500 kWh x $.092602 = $46.30] plus [4588 kT*:h x $.04089"? = 
$187.59] = $233.89) plus Energy Charge Adjustment (^ 038 k*:h x 
$.00406^= $20.66). Total monthly charge: $374.70. 
(b) Large customers: Customer Service 
Charge ($28.66), plus Demand Charge (18 kW x $9.18 per kT.v = 
$165.24), plus Energy Charge ([500 kWh x $.131'755 = $65,881 plus 
[4588 kWh x $.058169 = $266.88] = $33°.76), plus Energy Charge 
Adjustment (5088 kWh x $.00406 = $20.66). Total monthly charge: 
$54-\32. 
Total for eight low-use months: 8 monthr x $195.31 = 
$1,562.48; total for two high-use small customer months: 2 x 
$374.70 « $749.40; total for two high use large customer months: 
2 x $547.32 * $1,094.64. 
Total allowed for booster pump: $3,406.52. 
TT-M i «,• 4-«ioc fotai for both Dumps: $10r490.62. 
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e. Telephone: $600.00 per year. 
f. Directors1 Fees: $600.00 per year, of 
which $300 per year is allocated for directors' insurance. 
g. Legal Expenses: $3,000. Although there 
was some evidence offered indicating that Applicant's legal fees 
may exceed $10,000, we find that the majority of these fees would 
not have been incurred if Foothills had been certificated in 
1972. We thus accept the Division's recommendation that $3,000 
is reasonable (the Homeowners recommended no legal fees be 
granted). Vie further find that this amount should be capitalized 
over three years and thus allow $1,000 for 1986. 
h. Repairs and Maintenance: In this category, 
the Division recommends $21,600 and the Applicant 222,872. The 
Homeowners sponsored no exhibit in this area. The Division's 
figure is based on the reasonable cost of repairs and maintenance 
for other water utilities of approximately the same sine; Appli-
cant's figure is based upon Foothills' average cost of repairs 
and maintenance for the past fr.ur years. We find that Appli-
cant's method, which uses past data of the utility under consid-
eration, is mostly likely to yield accurate figures for 1986. Tve 
find further that the $2°, 8"? 2 figure should be reducer1 by the 
difference between the $20 per hnur paid during 1985 for repairs 
and maintenance and the SI"7.20 per hour we are allowing for 1986. 
Since 620 hours were billed for repair and maintenance from 
December 1, 1984 through November 30, 198=; (see Exhibit 56), the 
difference between the hourly rates ($2.30 per hour x 620 hours), 
*l,n2S, should be deducted. Total al\cwed: 521,136. 
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Applicant submitted proposed capital expenditures for 
1986 totalling $16,094 (see Exhibits 32, 33, and 34). [These 
proposed expenditures are accounted ^or in lines 3, 4, and 3 cf 
(division) Exhibit 5n. The Division recommended that Nos. 1, 3, 
4, 5 and 6 of Exhibit 57 be allowed, but reduced as follows: Mc. 
1: $2,000; No. 3: $1,900; No. 4: $3,234.21; No. 5: $1,000; No. 6: 
$1,000. Total: $9,100. Jon Strawn, a Division witness, testi-
fied that the total $9,100 could be paid for out cf the Divi-
sion's recommended $21,600 Repair and Maintenance expense.1 \<e 
note that in order to qualify for the reduced power rates allowed 
by the Commission, Applicant will incur some costs to set up the 
deep well pump for Schedule 3 operation. Since some capital 
costs (labor and perhaps materials also) have apparently been 
included in the past Repair and Maintenance figures (upon which 
we have based 1986 allowed expenses in this category), Applicant 
should be able to set up the deep well pump for Schedule 3 
operation without exceeding the amount we have allowed for 
Repairs and Maintenance. Proposed capital improvements are not 
Repair and Maintenance expenses. If allowed (the Commission will 
be disinclined to allow capital expenditures for which Applicant 
does not obtain competing bids) they are to be included in rate 
base at some future date. 
i. Chemicals: We find that the $400 per year 
recommended by the Division is reasonable. 
j. Water Testing: We find that the $1,200 per 
year recommended by the Division is reasonable. 
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k. Uncollectible Accounts; We find that the 
$4,200 per year recommended by the Division is reasonable. This 
figure assumes collection of only 50 percent of standby fees. 
1. Property Taxes: Title to the real property 
claimed by the utility is contested. Since the property valua-
tion and tax notices are sent to the Homeowners (see Exhibit 40), 
who have historically paid these taxes and have agreed to con-
tinue paying them, we allow Applicant no expense in this cate-
gory. At such time as a court of competent jurisdiction may 
quiet title to the real property in the Applicant, a reasonable 
expense in this category will be allowed. 
m. Deoreciation: We find it reasonable to 
— 
allow depreciation only on assets included in rate base (see 
paragraph 17, supra). Using Applicant's (P.evised Exhibit 24) and 
the Division's (Exhibit 83) depreciation schedules, we allow the 
following: 
(i) 1°31 assets: 52,622.93 x 5% = 
5131.15 
5111.65 
(ii) 1982 assets: $1,116.47 x 10% = 
(iii) 1983 assets: none. 
(iv) ^934 assets: none. 
(v) 1985 assets: 
(a) Booster pump: $2,^35.35 x 20% = 
f -• *± . 
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(b) Starter control panel: 
$2,128.16 x 10% = $212.82. 
(c) New tank overflow control 
valves, 6-inch metering station and l*-inch metering station: 
$7,743.08 x 5% = $38"?.15. Total depreciation: $1,339.77. 
n. Regulatory Fee: The Division recommended, 
and we find, that S150 per year is reasonable. 
Thus, Applicant's total allowed expenses are 
554,379.19. [Applicant also claimed an interest expense of 24 ,6 20 
(see Second Revised Exhibit 22). This is a belnw-the-line 
expense and not allowed.! 
TAXES 
20. The return to which Applicant is entitled is equal 
to rate base times rate of return, or $16,334.99 x .17 = $1,960. 
The taxes on this amount are as follows: 
a. Utah State Corporate Franchise Tax f~iT-e 
percent or $100 minimum): J100. 
b. Federal Tncome Tax (15 percent): $294. 
Total taxes allowed: S394.00 
TOTAL AMOUNT TO BE GENERATED PY PATES 
21. The total amount needed to be generated by rates: 
Expenses: $54,879.19; Return: $1,960.20; Taxes: J3°4.00. Total 
$57,^33.39. 
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REVENUES 
22. Standby Fees: In both the Timber Lakes Water case 
and the Silver Springs Water case (MCS. 82-076-01 and 85-570-01, 
respectively), the Commission found that S9.00 per month was a 
reasonable standby .^ ee. We find that $9.0 0 per month is also a 
reasonable standby for Foothills1 customers. Since the standby 
fee was set at SIO.OO per month in the Commission's Interim 
Order, Applicant shall credit $1.00 per mon^h to standby custom-
ers who have paid the $10.00 amount during the interim period. 
The standby charges will thus generate $9.00 per month x 12 
months x 54 customers = $5,8 32. 
23. Other Charges: We find that the following charges 
are reasonable: 
a. Connection Fee: S750.00. 
b. Turn-On Service: $50.00. 
c. Account Transfer Charge: $25.00 
d. Reconnection Fee: $50.00. 
e. Service Deposit: $100.00 (under the conditions 
set forth in Exhibit 30} . These charges should generate the 
following income during 1986: Connection Fees: One at $750.00; 
Reconnection and Turn-on Fees: $200,00. Total revenues: $950.00. 
24. Water Sales: According to the best available 
records, the Homeowners consumed approximately 16,000,000 gallons 
of water during 1985 (see Exhibit 59) * The Division estimates 
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that the Homeowners will consume the same amount of water in 19 86 
(see Exhibits 61 and 63). Applicant estimates that the Homeown-
ers will consume 12,358,00G gallons during 1986 {Exhibit 35). 
Although no price elasticity analysis was performed, the Commis-
sion is aware that as the price for a commodity increases the 
demand for that commodity is likely to fall. We find it probable 
that the increased costs of water will result in reduced consump-
tion by the Homeowners and find that approximately 13,000,000 
gallons will be consumed during 1986. The sale of the 13,000,000 
gallons must generate $50,451.39. 
RATE STRUCTURE 
25. T.n its Second Interim Order, the Commission estab-
lished a demand/commodity rate structure in which all customers 
paid $2"7.50 for the first 5,000 gallons and SI.50 per 1,000 
gallons thereafter. In the rate hearing, the Division recommend-
ed that the first block be increased to 10,000 gallons (see 
Exhibit 63). Norman Sims, President of the Homeowners' Asso-
ciation, however, testified that the 10,000 block was too large 
and recommended the 5,000 minimum be retained. T,Ce find that the 
5,000 minimum is reasonable and will tend to encourage conserva-
tion. We find also that both the demand and commodity charges 
will have to be increased over the interim rates in order to 
generate the required $50,451,39 and find that a rate of S3". 50 
for the first 5,000 gallons and $2.40 for every 1,000 gaMor.s 
thereafter is reasonable and will generate $50,480.40. 
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and sale of land, the Commission has stated its policy with 
respect to capital expenditures to be included in rate base: 
...it is the policy of the Commission to 
allow no return on investment by water 
companies unless such companies can meet the 
burden of showing that the investment made 
was not recovered in the sale of lots or in 
any other fashion. Dammeron Valley Water 
Company (Case No. 84-061-01, issued Januarv 
17, 1985 at p.7). 
It is the generally accepted rule that contributions in aid of 
construction should be excluded from rate base (see citations at 
PUR3d, Valuation, Sections 248, 250). Where a developer fails to 
demonstrate that an investment in a water utility was not re-
covered in the sale of lots, that investment is deemed to be a 
contribution in aid of construction and excludable from rate 
base. In a 1981 case, the Maryland Public Service Commission 
held: 
In determining the rate base of a water and 
sewer company that offered service only to a 
real estate developer and whose stock was 
solely owned by the real estate developer, 
the commission found that the real estate 
developer had recovered through the sale of 
the development's lots substantially most of 
his investment in the sewer company; further-
more, to say that the investor had recovered 
via the sale of lots substantially most of 
the investment in plant was analogous to 
finding that customers had made significant 
contributions in aid of construction, and 
that such payments were' customer-supplied 
capital. Re Crestview Services, Inc., 72 Md 
PSC 129, Case No. 7474, Order No. 65118, Feb. 
5, 1981. 
See also Re Northern Illinois Water Corp. (1959) 26 PUR3d 49"; Re 
Green-Fields Water Co. (1964) 53 PUR3d 670; North Carolina ex 
Y-oi _ utilities Commission v. Heater Utilities, Inc. (1975> ?9S :-!C 
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And in cases where the weight of the evidence indicates 
the developer knew it was subject to Commission jurisdiction and 
neglected or refused to seek Commission sanction of rates, that 
burden to justify rates by substantial evidence "rests heavily" 
indeed. An uncertificated public utility which enters into 
unreasonable contracts, or makes expenditures which the Commis-
sion has no opportunity to review, does so at the risk o^ not 
being able to recover those expenses in rates. Before allowing 
the recovery of such expenses, the utility must clearly demon-
strate by substantial evidence that the obligations and expendi-
tures arc reasonable and justified. 
This policy applies whether or not utility company 
assets have been transferred from one legal entity to another, 
even in arm's length transactions in which there is no imputation 
of impropriety, when to do otherwise would penalize utility 
ratepayers or defeat regulatory policy. See Colorado Interstate 
Gas Company v. Federal Power Commission, 224 US 5S1, 58 PVR(MS) 
65, 82-83 (1945); Cities Service Gas Company v. Federal Power 
Commission, 424 F.2d 411, 8"? PUR3d fO (10th Cir. .^969> ; Tennessee 
Public Service Commission v. Nashville Gas Co., 551 S*72d 315, 10 
PUR4th 66 (Tenn. 1977); Re H^L Utilities, Inc., 53 PUR4th 508 
(PSC^nd. 1983); Re Southern California Lumber Transport, 26 PUR3d 
291 (CalPUC 1958); Re John R. Peryatel, et al., dba Northern Mew 
Mexico Gas Company, 10 PUR3d ^1 (PSCNM 1957) . 
2. In cases (such as the instant one) where a public 
utility is created by a developer incidental to the subdivision 
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MISCELLANEOUS 
26. Pursuant to the Stipulation (Exhibit 1, as amended 
on the record), certain monies were collected by Dean Becker, 
attorney for the Homeowners, and placed in his trust account. To 
date, the Division has been unable to obtain from Mr. Becker an 
exact accounting of the amounts collected and disbursed from his 
trust account. It is reasonable for Mr. Becker to provide the 
Commission with a detailed accounting of all monies collected and 
disbursed on behal^ of Foothills and its customers. 
27. The Commission finds that it is reasonable and 
necessary for it to review and approve any proposed future lease 
or sale agreements for the provision of water to Applicant's 
service area. 
23. The Commission finds that the Revenues, Expenses 
and Rate Structure set xorth in Appendix A (made a part thereof 
by reference) are just and reasonable. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public 
Service Commission, 614 P.2d 1242 (1980), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated the general rule as to burden of proof is hearing before 
the Commission: 
In the regulation of public utilities by 
governmental authority, a fundamental princi-
ple is: the burden rests heavily upon a 
utility to prove it is entitled to rate 
relief and not upon the commission, the 
commission staff, or any interested party cr 
protestant; to prove the contrary. A utility 
has the burden of proof to demonstrate its 
nrnnnsed increase in rates and charges is 
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457, 1° PUR4th 548, 219 SE2d 56; Re Princess Anne Utilities Corp. 
(1969) 81 PUR3d 201; Re Kaanapali Water Corp., 673 P?c 584 
(Hawaii, 1984) . 
If a developer agrees to provide a specified water 
system, one meeting the standards of the Salt Lake County Kator 
Conservancy District, the Commission mav properly exclude rron 
rate base the cost of installing the system promisee if the 
utility does not sustain its burden of demonstrating the cost or 
the system was not recovered in lot sales. 
3. The Commission's authority over contracts entered 
into between public utilities and other parties derives from four 
sources: 
a. The Commission's General Jurisdiction. U.C.A. 
Section 54-3-1 mandates that the Commission assure that charges 
made...bv any public utility...for any product...shall be just 
and reasonable. Section 54-4-1 vests the Commission with: 
power and jurisdiction to supervise and 
regulate every public utility...to supervise 
all of the business of every such public 
utility in this state, and to do all things, 
whether herein specifically designated or in 
addition thereto, which are necessary cr 
convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently construed the general powers o£ 
the Commission in Kearns-Tribune Corporation v. Public Service 
Commission (No. 19203, filed May 1, 1984): 
...Any activities of a utility that actuaMy 
affect its rate structure would necessarily 
be subject to some degree to the PSC's broad 
supervisory powers in relation to rates. The 
question, then, is whether the activity the 
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Commission is attempting to regulate is 
closely connected to its supervision of the 
utility's rates and whether the manner of the 
regulation is reasonably related to the 
legitimate legislative purpose of rate 
control for the protection of the consumer. 
Although the Court in the Kearns-Tribune case held that the 
Commission did not have the power to regulate utility conduct 
which was peripheral to the setting of rates (tagline require-
ments) , in the instant case jurisdiction over the Well Lease 
Agreement is directly related to setting just and reasonable 
rates. 
In Garkane Power Association v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 681 P.2d 1207 (1984), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the 
Commission's jurisdiction over contracts entered into by public 
utilities: 
There can be no doubt that not every contract 
entered into by a public utility is subject 
to the jurisdiction of the PSC. Many con-
tracts for the purchase of supplies and 
equipment, and other contracts dealing with 
the ordinary conduct of a business, are 
contracts that could be litigated only in a 
district court not before the PSC. However, 
this dispute is clearly one that involves the 
validity of electric rates... 
In a separate opinion, Justice Durham (concurring and dissenting) 
went on to state: 
There is no question that the PSC has the 
authority to investigate, interpret and even 
alter contracts. That question was settled 
in an early series of cases brought iust 
after the enactment of Utah's Public Utility 
Act. In each case, the Public Utility 
Commission (PUC%- found a contract, executed 
before the institution of the PUC, in 
CASE TO. 85-2010-01 
-33-
violation of a subsequently filed rate. This 
Court upheld the PUC's alteration of the 
contracts, holding that the regulation of 
public utility rates was an exercise of the 
state's police power and was not an unconsti-
tutional impairment of contractual obliga-
tions. (See cases cited) 
Justice Durham went on to quote with approval from Arkansas 
Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas Railroad Commission, 2 61 U.S. 3 7 9 
(1923) , where the United States Supreme Court stated: 
The power to fix rates... is for the public 
welfare, to which private contracts must 
yield... (at 383) 
We conclude that the Commission has the authority ur/"er 
Soction 54-4-1 to interpret and apply the Well T.-ease Agreement as 
set forth in its Findings and that such interpretation and 
application are reasonable. 
b. The Commissions Authority Under U.C.A. Section 
54-4-4. This section grants the Commission authority to investi-
gate and modify unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferen-
tial rates, fares, rules, regulations, practices or contracts of 
a public utility. This section is generally understood to apply 
to contracts (tariffs) between a utility and its customers and we 
therefore conclude that it is not applicable to our present 
inquiry. 
c. The Commission's Authority Under U.C.A. Section 
54-4-26. This section grants the Commission authority to require 
a public utility to obtain Commission approval before entering 
into any contract requiring a utility expenditure and withhold 
approval of the contract if the Commission finds it is not 
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"proposed in good faith for the economic benefit of such public 
utility." Although the Commission has in Rule A67-05-95 of the 
Administrative Rules of the state of Utah (General Order 95) 
restricted the application of Section 54-5-26 to specific situa-
tions , we conclude that since Applicant was a de_ facto public 
utility since 1972, it was subject to the Commission's powers 
under this section. Since the failure of Applicant to become 
certified made it impossible for the Commission to become aware 
of the terms of the Well Lease Agreement before it was executed, 
the Commission concludes it has the power to review that cor.tr~.ct 
and withhold its approval now. We conclude that the Well Lease 
Agreement was not proposed in good faith for the economic benefit 
of Foothills and that the Commission is empowered to interpret 
and apply the Well Lease Agreement as set forth in its Findings 
and that such interpretation and application are reasonable. 
d. The Definition of the Term "Public Utility" 
Under Section 54-2-1 (30) (c) . This subsection, as amended in 
1985, states: 
(c) If any person or corporation performs any 
service for or delivers any commodity to any 
public utility as defined in this section, 
each person or corporation is considered to 
be a public utility and is subject to the 
jurisdiction and regulation of the commission 
and this title. 
Although Jesse Dansie, as the supplier of the water to Foothills 
clearly falls within the purview of this subsection, and could be 
declared a public utility by this Commission (and would have 
been, were it deemed necessary), we conclude that such a 
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determination is unnecessary in view of the Commission's juris-
diction over the Well Lease Agreement under sections 54-5-1 and 
54-4-26 as set forth above. 
4. The Commission does not have the power to settle 
disputes as to ownership of utility property. It is the general 
rule that assets no-*- ownod by a public utility canno- be included 
in rate base; where title to utility property is disputed the 
courts are divided. See, e.g., Re Consumers Co. , PUR1923A, 418 
(Idaho, 1923); Re Capital Citv Water Co., PUR"9 25D, 41 (Mo. 
1925); Re HiVcrest Water Co., 5 Ann. Rep. Ohio PUC 57 (Ohio 
191 ~!; Frackville Taxpayers' Assoc, v. Frackville Sewage Co. , ~ 
PUR(NS) 515 (Pa., 1934^. 
5. The $3,000 allowed Applicant for attorney's rees 
should be capitalized over a period of three vears. 
6. Applicant is entitled to an increase in its rates 
and charges in order to collect total revenues in the amount of 
$5^,260. The rates and charges set forth in the Findings of Fact 
and Appendix A are just and reasonable, do not reflect infla-
tionary expectations, and are the minimum necessar; to enable 
Applicant to render adequate service and meet current and expect-
ed demand. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Administrative Law Judge 
now recommends the following: 
ORDER 
NOT«7, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Applicant be, 
and the same hereby is, authorized to publish its tariff 
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incorporating the rates and charges as set forth in the Findings 
of Fact and Appendix A, which is attached hereto and incorporated 
by reference. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dean H. Becker, Attorney, 
file with this Commission, within thirty (30) days of the issu-
ance of this Order, an exact accounting of all amounts collected 
and disbursed from his trust account or any other accounts on 
behalf of Foothills or its customers. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Foothills obtain approval 
from this Commission before entering into any future lease or 
sales agreements for the provision of water to Foothills1 service 
area or any amendment tc or assignment of any lease or sales 
agreement that is now in force and effect. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the legal description of 
Applicant's service area shall be as follows: 
BEGINNING at Northeast corner of the Southwest quarter 
of the Southwest quarter of Section 33, Township 3 
South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and 
running thence: 
A. West to the Northwest corner of the Southwest quarter 
of the Southwest quarter of said Section 33; 
B. South to the Northeast corner of Section 5, Township 4 
South, Range 2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; 
C. West to the Northwest corner of the Northeast quarter 
of the Northeast quarter of said Section 5; 
D. South to the Southwest corner of the Northeast quarter 
of the Northeast quarter of said Section 5; 
E. West tc the Northwest corner of the Southwest quarter 
of the Northwest quarter of said Section 5; 
F. South to the Southwest corner of said Section 5; 
CASE NO, 85-2010-01 
-37-
East to the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter 
of the Southwest quarter of said Section 5; 
North to the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter 
of the Southwest quarter of said Section 5; 
East to the center of said Section 5; 
South to the Southwest corner of the Northwest quarter 
of the Southeast quarter of said Section 5; 
East to the Souther-nt corner of the Northeast quarter 
of the Southeast quarter of said Section 5; 
S^uth to the Southwest corner of Lot 103, Hi-Country 
Estates Subdivision; 
Southeasterly to the Southeast corner of said Let 103; 
Northeasterly along East property line of Lots ""OS and 
102, Hi-Country Estates Subdivision; to the West line 
of the Southeast quarter of the Southwest quarter of 
Section 4, T4S, R2W; 
South to the Southwest corner of the Southeast quarter 
of the Southwest quarter of said Section 4; 
East to the Southeast corner of the Southwest quarter 
of the Southeast quarter of said Section 4; 
North to the Northeast corner or the Southwest quarter 
of the Southeast quarter of said Section 4; 
West to the Northwest comer of the Southwest quarter 
of the Southeast quarter of said Section 4; 
North to the North quarter comer of said Section 4; 
East to the Southeast corner of Lot 1A, Ki-Country 
Estates Subdivision; 
North to the South boundary of Hi-Countrv Read; 
Easterly along the South boundary of Ki-Country Road to 
the South boundary of Highway U-lll; 
Northwesterly along South boundary of Highway U-lll to 
the North line of the Southeast quarter of the South-
west quarter of Section 33 T3S, R2W; 
West to the point of beginning. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Applicant be, and the same 
hereby is, authorised to publish its new tariff effective on one 
day's notice to the public and Commission; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order be, and the same 
hereby is, effective on issuance. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of March, 
1986. 
/s/Kent Walgren 
Administrative Law Judge 
Approved and confirmed this 17th day of March, 1936, as 
the Report and Order of the Commission. 
Is! Frer.t H. Cameron, Chairman 
Is! James M, Byrne, Commissioner 
(SEAL> Is! Brian T. Stev/art, Commissioner 
Attest: 
Is! Georgia B, Peterson 
Executive Secretarv 
EXHIBIT C 
ROBERT A. BENTLEY (0249^ 
Attorney for Hi-Country-'Honiedwn 
50 West Broadway, #1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 328-9085 
€t$ rAssociat ion 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
In The Matter of the Petition 
of the Hi-Country Homeowners 
Association for a Declaratory 
Order in re: Standby Fees 
PETITION 
Case No. 88-2010-01 
This is an Petition for a Declaratory Order pursuant to UCA 63-
46a-155 and for the recision or amendment of a decision of the Public 
Service Commission for purpose of determining a question of actual 
controversy between the parties as hereinafter more fully appears. 
Petitioner, Hi-Country Homeowners Association pursuant to UCA 
54-7-13 and UCA 63-46A-15 seeks a Declaratory Order finding and 
determining that the Readiness-to-Serve charges (standby fees) 
contained in the Report and Order of Administrative Law Judge Kent 
Walgren dated March 17, 1986 and the Tariff of Foothills Water Co. 
exceeds the scope of the Commissions jurisdiction and authority, 
contains an an unjust and unreasonable classification of service and 
is further violative of the 14th Amendment of the US Constitution 
and Article 1 §2 of the Cons t i tut ion of the State of Utah. In support 
of said Petition, Petitioners allege as follows: 
1. Petitioner is a Utah non-profit corporation consisting of 
the homeowners of Hi-Country Estates subdivision, Phase I located a 
few miles southeast of Heriman, Salt Lake County, UT. Pursuant to 
the articles, bylaws and Protective Covenants of the Association, 
all lot owners whether developed or undeveloped are members of the 
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association. The association is likewise charged with the duty of 
representing the interests of all lot owners. 
2. On March 17, 1986 Administrative Law Judge Kent Walgren 
entered a Report and Order which was approved and confirmed by the 
Commission on the same day. On page 26, paragraph 22 the Judge found 
as follows: 
"Standby Fees: In both the Timber Lakes Water case and the Silver 
Springs Water case (Nos 82-076-01 and 85-570-01, respectively), The 
Commission found that $9.00 per month was a reasonable standby fee. 
We find that $9.00 per month is also a reasonable standby fee for 
Foothills 1 customers. Since the standby fee was set at $10.00 per 
month in the Commission's Intermin Order, Applicant shall credit 
$1.00 per month to standby customers who have paid the $10.00 amount 
during the interim period. The standby charges will thus generate 
$9.00 per month x 12 months x 54 customers = $5,832." 
Pursuant to that finding the Standby fee was included oi ; age 2 
of the Foothills Water Co. Tariff, attached hereto as exhibit A. 
3. Property owners were notified the same day of the charge by 
way of a Memorandum from Ralph N. Creer, Director of the Division 
of Public Utilities. A copy of said memorandum is attached hereto 
as Exhibit B. 
4. The Tariff itself does not specify whether the fee applies 
to all lot owners or just to owners of developed lots. The March 17, 
1986 Memorandum states that the fee is assessed against owners of 
undeveloped property within the Foothills Water Co. service area. 
The Utility has taken the position the the Standby fee applies to 
undeveloped property owners as well as owners of developed property 
who have wells and are not on the water system. It has filed suit in 
the 1st Precient Justice Court for Salt Lake County, Utah to collect 
such fees from both classes of owners. 
5. At the time the tariff was adopted there were 63 developed 
parcels and 54 undeveloped lot owners. The number of undeveloped 
lot owners was used as the bases for the calculation of the standby 
fees, (see exhibit A.) 
6. Petitions assert and claim that the Tariff is vague and 
subject to misinterpretation in the following manner: 
(a) The tariff does not specify who is liable for Standby 
fees. The tariff literally applies the standby fee to everyone 
including actual users. The Utility claims that the fee applies to 
all lots which are not active customers. The Division has claimed 
that the fee only applies to undeveloped lots. All lot owners require 
a Declaratory Order specifyingwho, if anyone, is liable for the fees. 
(b) The Tariff does not specify who is liable for the $10 
late fee assessed to customers who are more than 30 days delinquent. 
Although such a late fee may be appropriate for actual customers it 
is oppressive, confiscatory and usurious to standby customers whose 
maximum monthly bill is only $9. The $10 later fee constitutes an 
interest rate in excess of 110% on standby accounts and as such is 
violative of the Utah Consumer Credit Code (UCA 70C-2-102) and other 
state statutes and Court decisions dealing with usurious and 
unconsionable interest rates and fees. 
(c) Said fees, even if they are found to be appropriate do 
not constitute a lien on the property and it is thus unjust, and 
unlawful to require any lot owner to pay standby fees incurred by 
his predecessors. Homeowners Loan Corp. v. Logan City 92 P.2d 346 
(1936). 
own private wells it cannot be said that undeveloped property owners 
are necessarily future customers. 
(c) Any benefit noncustomers receive from the 
existence of the utility and its capacity to supply them with water 
at some time in the future is remote, speculative and nonchargable 
to such owners. 
(i) The original purchasers of lots in the service 
area paid for the cost of the creation of the water system by the 
original developers. Since the original capitalization of the system 
was borne by all lot owners, whether they developed those lots or 
not, additional fees should not be assessed to owners who do rot use 
the system. Any enhancement in the property values have been paid 
to the original developers who created the system. 
(ii) It cannot be said that undeveloped property 
owners will ever make use of the system. All lot owners have access 
to economical artesian water by drilling a well on their property 
as many have done. The utility is presently suing owners of developed 
lots who use their own wills for water, asserting that they are 
liable for the standby fees. Such owners do not use or benefit from 
the system and do not intent to use it in the future. 
(iii) The value of the existence of the utility to 
homeowners is speculative. In accessing the standby fee, the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Commission did not calculated it 
on the basis of the benefit received by lot owners but rather on the 
revenue the fee would provide to the utility as a means of offsetting 
the rate charges to customers. 
7. Petitioners assert and claim that such fees as they apply 
to all property owners including those not receiving service from 
the utility are inappropriate, improper and unlawful as: 
(a) exceeded the scope of authority given to the commission 
to set reasonable and just utility rates as provided in UCA 54-1-2 
and/or UCA 54-3-1. 
(b) Constituting an unjust and unreasonable standard, and 
classification of service to be furnished. 
(c) Constituting a preference and unreasonable difference 
as to rates and charges between classes of service in violation of 
UCA 54-3-8; 
(d) unconstitutional under the 14th Amendment to the Uni ted 
States Constitution and Article 1 §2 of the Utah State Constitution 
as being violative of the equal protection clauses contained therein; 
8. In support of such claims, Petitioners allege as follows: 
(a) Such fees create an unconstitutional classification 
and denies lot owners of the equal protection of the law. The 
classification is invidious and arbitrary and bears no reasonable 
relationship to the determination of a just and fair rate to be paid 
by customers of the utility. Whether a lot is developed or not has 
little or no relationship to the utilities cost of providing actual 
service to its customers. 
(b) It is improper to assess a utility fee against a owner 
of property which does not receive and may never elect to receive 
service from the utility. In light of the availability of artesian 
water and the number of lot owners who obtain there water from their 
(iv) The connection fee is the proper fee to reimburse 
the utility for its readiness to serve. The connection fee present 
set at $750 exceeds the actual cost of connection. It is through 
this fee that prospective users should pay for access to the system. 
Only this fee properly directs the cost of the service being available 
to those who wish to use it. 
(v) To the extent that the standby fee is needed to 
generate revenue the undeveloped lot and off-system owners are 
improperly subsidizing the users of the system through the fee. 
Those owners are not standing by for service in even the most liberal 
use of the term. They are at best are potential users of the system 
and as such are comparable to nonresidents of the utilities service 
area who may at some point in the future buy lots in Hi-Country 
Estates and request water service at that time. To the extent the 
utility must maintain capacity to serve such lots, the cost of 
maintaining that capacity should be recouped at the time of connection 
through the connection fee. 
WHEREFORE, Pet i t i oners pray that the Commiss ion rev iew its March 
17, 1983 Report and Order in the above entitled matter along with 
the tariff thereunder and issue an Order declaring as follows: 
1. The the Standby fees are a improper means of raising revenue 
for a utilities opera t ing expenses, Order the utility to stop assessing 
such fees and return all fees previously collected to the payor, and/or 
2. Clarify which lot owners are liable for standby fees, and 
whether standby owners are liable for the fees of prior lot owners 
and the $10 late fee, and 
3. Such other and further relief as the Commission may find to 
be just and reasonable in the premises. 
DATED this (dlH day of March 1988. 
Robert A. Bentley / 
Attorney for Petitioners 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Petition by first class mail, postage prepaid, to Val 
Antczak, Attorney for Foothills Water Company, Parsons, Behle & 
Latimer 185 So. State #700 Salt Lake City UT. 84111 and Dale T. 
Coulam, Attorney for Division of Public Utilities, Office of the 
Attorney General, State of Utah 236 State Capitol Salt Lake City, 
UT 84114 on this l/)Jtt day of March, 1988. 
j£l (<*^ B. 
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FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY Utah P.S.C. 2nd Revised Sheet No. 
P.O. Box 477 Superseding Original Sheet No. 
Riverton, Utah 84065 
I A. SERVICE RATE SCHEDULE 
APPLICABILITY 
Applicable in entire service area to water service for culinary 
and domestic purposes at one point of delivery for use at a 




First 5,000 gallons $37,75 minimum 
service 
3es 
charge for each 
connection 
All additional gallons $ 2.40 per 1,000 gallons 
SERVICE CONNECTION FEE 
= U ^ \ 
3/4" Service to Property Line,, I 
one-time charge for each lot requiring c 
new meter installation, to be *\ 
paid in full before water service J 
will be provided. -*s 
ANNUAL STANDBY FEE 
Monthly Standby Fee (Ready-to-Serve Charge)* 
OTHER CHARGES 
1. Turn-on service for new customer 
where meter is already in place 
2. Reconnection fee after disconnection 
3. Account transfer charge 
4. Meter tested 
15. Customer late fee (Applied to customers 
bill when current month's bill is 30 
days delinquent) 
6. Service Deposit 
7. Returned check charge 
1 * The annual standby fee may be paid monthly 





$ 25.00 . ^ 
$ 10.00 'p*L " 
$ 10.00 
$100.00 
$ 10.00 (N) 
or annually in 
unpaid balance 
J arising from this fee shall bear interest at 1 1/2% per month. J 
Any unpaid standby fees for a particular premise, including | 
those fees incurred by prior owners, along with 
J interest, must be paid in full before water 
J provided. 
any accumulated 
service will be 
i 
Advice Letter No. Date Filed 5/29/87 
Case No. 85-2010-01 Effective Date 6/1/87 
Foothills Water Company 
EXHIBIT D 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
In the Matter of the Request ) CASE NO. 88-2010-01 
of FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY for) 
an Increase in Rates. ) ORDER 
ISSUED: March 28. 1988 
Appearances: 
Dale T. Coulam, For Division of Public 
Assistant Attorney Utilities, Department of 
General Business Regulation, 
State of Utah 
Val R. Antczak " Foothills Water Company 
Robert A Bentley " Homeowners' Association 
By the Commission: 
Pursuant to notice duly served, Applicant's Motion for 
Stay of Further Proceedings came on for hearing on the 22nd day of 
March, 1988, before the Commission at its offices at 160 East 300 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah. After consideration of written and 
oral arguments from the above-named parties, the Commission issues 
the following 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That Applicant's 
Motion for Stay of Further Proceedings is granted and this matter 
shall be stayed until final resolution of the Quiet Title action 
presently pending before the Third Judicial District Court for the 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the Division shall continue 
its investigation of Applicant, to the extent possible, in prepar-
ation for expedited further proceedings in this matter following 
< % 
% 
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District Court action including, but not limited to, a monthly 
review (as opposed to actual compilation) of Applicant's books and 
records to verify that Applicant is maintaining such records in an 
appropriate manner. 
DATED in Salt Lake City, Utah this 28th day of March, 
1988. 
.^-
8—y- f f o / j . . . . . .™ 
Brian T. /Stpwart . /Chairman 
7 XvJ\/ ftw^--* i - c - * 
Brent H. Cameron, Commissioner 
Attest: 
Jtephen C. Hewlett Ste
Commission Secretary 
{ U<1«^<? fr*. t ^ 
s/ 
Jam^s M. Byrne, Commissioner 
